We instruct the minor, i.e., the surviving brother’s wife, to refuse to continue to stay married to him so that her marriage is dissolved, and he may then enter into levirate marriage with her adult sister, the widow of his childless brother. And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara explains: When Shmuel says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, what he meant was four cases within Seder Teharot in the Mishna, the order that deals with ritual purity. But in the other orders, there are many instances where the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara adds: This too stands to reason, as we learned in a mishna in the order of Zera’im (Ḥalla 2:4) that Rabbi Eliezer says: Even with regard to one who removes loaves of bread from an oven and places them in a basket, the basket serves to combine them to reach the quantity from which one is required to separate ḥalla, despite the fact that each of the loaves does not contain the necessary measure for ḥalla on its own. And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Conclude from this that Shmuel’s general statement applies only to Seder Teharot.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: The case of ḥalla was cited as proof that there is an exception to Shmuel’s principle that there are only four cases where the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, after a difficulty was raised from the case of levirate marriage with the sister of one’s minor wife. But in what way is this case of ḥalla greater proof than that case of the levirate marriage? Neither case appears in Seder Teharot. The Gemara answers: The case of the levirate marriage is different, as there Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

As we learned in the mishna (Yevamot 111b): A yavam may perform levirate marriage with only one of his deceased brother’s wives. Once he does so, the other wives are forbidden to him, because they had been married to his brother. If a deceased brother had two wives, an adult and a minor, and the yavam engaged in sexual intercourse with the minor and then engaged in intercourse with the adult, the Rabbis maintain that he disqualifies the minor from staying married to him, as her levirate bond is uncertain, and the adult wife is also prohibited to him, because the levirate marriage with the minor is considered effective by rabbinic law. Rabbi Elazar says: The court instructs the minor to refuse him, thereby annulling her marriage retroactively, and he may then perform levirate marriage with the adult. Accordingly, the case of ḥalla is a stronger example, as there the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer exclusively, as his opinion is not supported by another tanna.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But doesn’t the Gemara (Yevamot 111b) explain that both the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Elazar are necessary, as they apply to different cases, and therefore they are not comparable to each other? The Gemara suggests a new answer: Rather, the ruling with regard to levirate marriage is a weaker example of a case where the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with his opinion.

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testified about five matters of halakha: Normally, marriage refusals of girls married off by their mother or brothers are discouraged. Yet, in specific instances where it is clear that if the marriage were to remain in effect it would engender problems related to levirate marriage and ḥalitza, the court persuades minor girls to refuse to continue living with their husbands, thereby resolving the complications involved in the case.

And he also testified that one may allow a woman who seeks to remarry after hearing of her husband’s death to marry based on the testimony of one witness, as opposed to the two witnesses required for other matters of testimony. And he further testified that a rooster was stoned to death in Jerusalem for killing a person, in order to teach that the Torah law requiring the stoning of an ox that killed a person (see Exodus 21:28) applies to other animals as well. And he testified about forty-day-old wine that was used for libation on the altar. And finally, he testified about the daily morning offering that was sacrificed at four hours of the day.

The Gemara concludes its proof: When the baraita teaches that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testified that the court persuades minor girls to refuse to continue living with their husbands, what is the significance of the reference to minor girls in the plural? Is this not referring to the one minor girl who is the subject of the ruling of Rabbi Elazar and the other one that is the subject of the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer? Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the minor’s refusal. If so, this ruling is a weaker proof that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in cases outside of Seder Teharot. The Gemara answers: No, what is meant by the plural: Minor girls? It means minor girls in general, i.e., all minor girls in such cases where the ruling of Rabbi Elazar applies.

The Gemara challenges: If so, with regard to the halakha listed in the baraita that one may allow a woman to marry based on the testimony of one witness, let it also teach: Women, in the plural, and we will say that it is referring to women in general. Rather, from the fact that here it teaches: A woman, and yet here it teaches: Minor girls, conclude from this discrepancy that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava is teaching his ruling specifically about two minor girls: The one who is the subject of Rabbi Elazar’s ruling and the one who is the subject of Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling. The Gemara comments: Indeed, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

§ And similarly, Rabbi Elazar says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases. The Gemara asks: And are there no more? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: The court instructs the minor to refuse to stay married to him, and Rabbi Elazar said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? The Gemara adds: And if you would say that when Rabbi Elazar said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, he meant four cases within Seder Teharot, but in the other orders of the Mishna there are many cases, are there really other such cases?

But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shevi’it 7:6) that the halakha of the following fragrant plants: The rose, the henna, the rockrose, and the balsam, is that they have the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, and money exchanged for them has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Additionally, they have the halakha of eradication and money exchanged for them has the halakha of eradication. And with regard to this mishna, Rabbi Pedat said: Who is the tanna who taught that balsam has the status of a fruit, and is not merely sap, and therefore it has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year? It is Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Pedat: One can see that from you and from your father, i.e., between the two of you, you have permitted balsam to the world, since the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer is certainly not accepted. As you said: Who is the tanna who taught that balsam has the status of a fruit? It is Rabbi Eliezer. And your father, Rabbi Elazar, said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in only four cases.

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, that Rabbi Elazar was referring only to Seder Teharot, then let Rabbi Pedat say to Rabbi Zeira: When my father said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, he meant only four cases within Seder Teharot, but in the other orders there are other such cases. From the fact that Rabbi Pedat did not reply in this manner, evidently there are no cases in the other orders of the Mishna where, according to Rabbi Elazar, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara asks: But that case, where the amora Rabbi Elazar said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to persuading a minor to refuse to stay married to her husband, is difficult. This apparently conflicts with the statement that there are only four cases in which Rabbi Elazar rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara answers: There the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer only because the tanna Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with his opinion. As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Elazar says: The court instructs the minor to refuse to stay married to him, thereby annulling her marriage retroactively.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in that case of the minor? But doesn’t the Gemara in Yevamot explain that both the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Elazar are necessary, and therefore they are not comparable to each other? Rather, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in that case because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with his opinion, as explained earlier.

The Gemara asks: And are there no more cases in which Rabbi Elazar maintains that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Berakhot 33a): One recites the prayer of distinction between the holy and the profane [havdala], said in the evening prayer following Shabbat and festivals, in the fourth blessing of the Amida prayer: Who graciously grants knowledge. Rabbi Akiva says: One recites havdala as a fourth blessing by itself. Rabbi Eliezer says that one recites it in the blessing of thanksgiving. And with regard to this dispute, Rabbi Elazar says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rabbi Abba said, in explanation: That case is different, as that is not the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer himself. Rather, he stated that ruling in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: One recites havdala as a fourth blessing by itself; Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: One recites it in the blessing of thanksgiving.